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Joseph’s journal: 39

12 Kislev, 4808 (November, 1059)

The most important spoils distributed to the troops after the battle with Muhktar’s army came from the tributes collected from the former territories of Seville, now annexed to Grenada. My father convinced King Badis to award colonels and captains, as well as the generals, confiscated farms and orchards. Some of these men became landowners for the first time. Those captured officers, who came from families of substance, were ransomed. Those profits, along with the king’s fifth of everything, all went to Badis.

Eleven years after the battle, I visited the site. While standing on the same ground I remembered portions of the poem my father wrote after a previous victory over Seville, a battle that took place twenty years ago. He wrote how the king of Seville had mocked Granada and its king. How we responded seeking to take back what Seville had taken and revenge for its brutality. How that army had prevailed, with vivid descriptions of Granada’s heroes and their deeds. The poem is one of my favorites.

Abu Nun, the leaders of the Carmona and Moron contingents, and those of their soldiers who managed to escape, retreated to their respective strongholds. One of the captured Sevillian officers, who had achieved his rank by virtue of ability rather than birth, was given his freedom, with the task of returning Muhktar’s head to Mutadid. I never found out if Mutadid rewarded him for this task, or had the brave man murdered.

My father with his army, minus those troops assigned to escort our wounded, the enemy captives, and wagons full of booty, back to Grenada, followed Abu Nun to Ronda. Once again that fortress was besieged. Within a week, the weather changed heralding a long winter. True to form, the Zanhadja chiefs were not willing to participate in a long winter siege. They had their victory and significant booty. They decided to spread out on the way home so they could collect more tribute from the towns, villages, and cities along the way. Father was forced to abandon the siege and return to Granada, realizing he had achieved a great tactical victory but suffered a strategic defeat by not taking Ronda.

Once he was home, Father explained to me that unless he could bring all of the smaller states in as allies of Granada, or neutralize them in some other way, Granada could not be secure and at peace. It was clear to him that Mutadid intended to fight.

He had two choices. The first was to build and maintain alliances that would eventually enable him to destroy Seville. The other option was to attack and kill all the leaders of the small states and absorb those lands. The later choice was beyond his resources. He explained to me that even if he had all the resources necessary, the task would be too difficult, and too risky. The other option, forming a coalition against Seville, would not be easy, and would be even more difficult to maintain. Father understood that any states who joined his alliance would probably desert the alliance as victory over Seville became more likely. Their ultimate goal of any city/state was to retain its autonomy. They would not want to risk being absorbed by Granada, despite their natural antipathy to Arab Seville. All of these potential allies harbored a realistic fear of Granadian hegemony, once Seville was neutralized. There was also the Berbers’ natural laziness, and inability to see and understand the large picture. He cautioned me to never admit to this evaluation, especially to any of the Zanhadja. Most especially not to Badis.

Father’s first task was to convince the independent rulers, their viziers, and tribal chiefs, that this war needed to be fought to prevent the hated Umayyads from conquering and reuniting all of Andalusia. The major historical motivations for the Berbers to go to war were the potential for looting and plunder. He patiently explained to them that this war had to be different. Its goal was to stop the Umayyads.

The king of Moron, and the chiefs of his tribal families, recognized the superiority of the Zanhadja military and the leadership of my father. With Father’s encouragement, they managed to conjure up memories of the humiliation of years of defeats by the Umayyads. It was to their advantage to rekindled their hatred of the Umayyad dynasty. They abandoned Mutadid and joined my father’s coalition.

Carmona, only thirty kilometers from Seville, was not happy with Mutadid’s leadership, and especially his megalomaniac behavior. Their leaders also paid homage to my father’s skill as a general. They signed on, as did the leaders of Arcos. The potential reward for these Zenata Berbers, who were still leery of the Zanhadja, was sweetened by the possibility of their being able to appropriate the riches of Seville. They anticipated that Seville, after this most recent defeat by my father, would be easier pickings than Granada had proven to be.

Huelva was a tiny village located at the confluence of the Odile and Tinto rivers in the delta opening to the Gulf of Cadiz. It was about a hundred kilometers west of Seville. This town was a gate to the back door of Seville and its Berber leaders couldn’t resist the symbolic and religious sanctification of the alliance Father offered. They also, of course, were interested in booty.

Father was also constantly on the lookout for a person with the necessary family background to instill as the titular Hammudite Caliph. Such a puppet Caliph would serve as a person all of the Berbers could provide lip service to, and rally around, while still maintaining their independence. The King of Malaga would have been ideal, but he was already aligned with Seville, and still nurtured a grudge against Badis and Grenada.

The head of a different branch of the Hammudite family ruled Algecira, a tiny port city located at the tip of the straits of Gibraltar. My father eventually managed to convince his new allies to accept this man as their Caliph. To sanctify this charade, Father arranged a solemn ceremony to invest the new Caliph, and convinced the kings of Granada, Carmona, Moron, and Arcos to attend. The rulers who attended the festivities didn’t come alone. Their families, their nobles, their tribal chiefs, and their viziers accompanied them. The kings of Badajoz and Huelva were unable to attend, citing ill health, but they sent high-ranking nobles and their entourages in their stead.

As a diplomat, Father was at the zenith of his power and prestige. For a Jew to play such a crucial role in organizing and maintaining a military and cultural alliance that would assure the survival of so many independent city/states, was a diplomatic success not previously known.

Abu Nun, secure in his fortress of Ronda, decided he had to establish complete independence from both Granada and Seville. He decided to wait for a clear indication of which of the two big powers would be successful before making any commitments. He knew very well the character of his Berber relatives. All of them worried about any single big state encompassing them. He also understood that the draw of easy plunder was too tempting for them to ignore. Abu Nun managed to convince his chiefs it would be wise to forego any temptation for easy pickings, and to sit on the sidelines for the time being.